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5 Julia J. A. Shaw1
6
7  Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017
8
9 Aesthetics originates from the Greek word aisthētikos (sensation or perception by
10 the senses as opposed to reason) which is derived from aisthanesthai (to perceive or
11 feel) and, while implicated in the production of metaphors and substitution, it has
12 analogic connections to ethics and acts upon the emotions. In The Theory of Moral
13 Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith placed aesthetic perceptions and emotional
14 reactions at the heart of moral judgment, and took the view that legal judgment
15 is as much a property of feeling as of intellectual understanding or reason. To situate
16 institutions such as slavery and destitution within a discourse of mercy, for example,
17 comprises a form of sentimental jurisprudence which prioritises the synthesis of
18 morality and compassion with social reality; but more importantly requires the
19 ability to visualise, without self-interest, the circumstances in which the oppressed
20 find themselves. Although, in general, aesthetic discourse allows a measure of
21 flexibility that typically moral discourse often lacks, aesthetics and moral principles
22 are not necessarily disparate notions. Just as Immanuel Kant concluded in his
23 articulation of beauty as a distinct moral category in Critique of Judgment, similarly
24 for Friedrich Schiller the adoption of an appropriately moral disposition (deemed
25 essential for moral actions) depends on aesthetic sensitivity. This is because only an
26 aesthetic sensibility was considered to have both a transformative and educative
27 impact which enabled ‘universally valid judgments and universally valid actions’ to
28 become ‘an object of the heart’s desire’ (Schiller 1967, p. 33.5, 9.7). The cultivation
29 of an inner sense of beauty or aesthetic attitude was also considered necessary in
30 order to overcome the egoism of aesthetic taste, by increasing receptivity to the
31 human condition and in so doing, internalising the rational call of conscience and
32 moral duty.
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33 From particle physics to ecology and geodesy, the fundamental rules and laws of
34 nature which govern the interdependence between natural systems are graceful and
35 compelling: Galileo referred to the elegance of particular formulae and Einstein
36 maintained that a sense of the beautiful contributed to the making of scientific
37 discoveries. The latter further claimed that the frame of mind required for a
38 successful scientific breakthrough was that of a ‘lover’, since only ‘intuition resting
39 on sympathetic understanding’ can lead to the unearthing of universal elementary
40 laws and the daily effort required in this endeavour comes ‘straight from the heart’
41 (Einstein 2009, p. 4, 5). For Karl Polanyi, this ‘sense of intellectual beauty’ is rooted
42 in concepts such as organisation, transcendence and meaningfulness and influences
43 our feeling towards certain values and a particular conception of reality (1962,
44 p. 135). In Fyodor Dostoevsky’s novel, The Idiot, the main character Prince
45 Myshkin declares ‘Beauty will save the world’, because it has a profound effect on
46 both the mind and soul (2001, p. 382). This was no ordinary definition of beauty;
47 rather, he was moved by the poignancy of the vulnerability and suffering etched in
48 the face of a picture of a young woman who had been cruelly abused as a child by a
49 wealthy guardian, shown to him by his hostess Madame Yepanchin. Just as Prince
50 Myshkin takes on the suffering of others almost as his own, by reading the story we
51 also become a part of it. The often difficult coupling of ethics and aesthetics, via the
52 medium of fiction, can provoke in the observer (as listener, reader or watcher) a
53 feeling of sympathetic sorrow but, more importantly, a sense of ethical responsi-
54 bility. In real life, the person recounting their story relives it, only now in an
55 imaginary way, whilst their audience is able to fictionalise or aestheticise their
56 primary emotional reaction which allows its communication via the aesthetic
57 imaginative faculties. As Dostoevsky explained at greater length in Notes from
58 Underground, ‘suffering is the sole origin of consciousness’; it also alerts our senses
59 to the one in need and signifies an aesthetic–ethical order where the ideal of beauty
60 equates with sympathy, goodness and moral truth or purity (1960, p. 31).
61 Against the instrumentality of law, to understand something as beautiful is to stop
62 asking ‘what is it for?’, since pure aesthetic judgment relies on the acknowledgment
63 of an inner finality of form which is not defined by a fixed standard, neither is it
64 concerned with the object’s purpose. Rather, the potential redemptive and unifying
65 power of a judgment of beauty lies in the bringing together of sense and reason; a
66 combination which is considered essential to realising political and social cohesion.
67 According to Schiller, it is possible to accomplish the transition from the spiritual
68 ideal of ‘beauty’ to ‘truth and duty’ because ‘beauty combines the two opposite
69 conditions of perceiving and thinking… and thus removes the opposition’, so that
70 the resulting affective, meaningful and intellectual unity becomes an object for
71 reflection towards the ultimate aim, namely, truth (1967, p. 32). Aesthetic
72 judgments, as disinterested or impartial judgments, are arguably indispensable to
73 legal judgment as they cannot be reduced to abstract propositions. They combine an
74 individual emotional or sensual response together with the pre-existing parameters
75 of legal sources and procedures, towards establishing not a literal ‘truth’ but a kind
76 of authenticity which has its roots in the intersubjective nature of considered
77 judgments. Slavoj Žižek suggests in Welcome to the Desert of the Real that the
78 terms designated to democracy and freedom, human rights and the war on terror, for
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79 example, are anything but true. Rather, they have been co-opted by law and mask
80 their origins. These ‘false terms’ only serve to mystify our ‘perception of the
81 situation instead of allowing us to think it. In this precise sense our ‘‘freedoms’’
82 themselves serve to mask and sustain our deeper unfreedom’ (Žižek 2002, p. 2).
83 Consequently, such reality-framing ugly untruths or partial truths being passed off
84 as law’s narratives of truth means we lack the language to fully articulate our
85 ‘unfreedom’.
86 The pursuit of objective truth or truth as justice, as opposed to the arbitrariness of
87 law’s truth, demands we interrogate the narratives behind simple acts of judgment
88 and legal principle; because the business of law-making is not disconnected from
89 the world of aesthetics in its liberal appropriation of symbolism and sensuous
90 expression. In the case of partial truths about terror, for example, which serve to
91 legitimate a series of intrusive laws curtailing personal freedom and—in many
92 instances, unjustifiably help to promote a climate of fear—it is necessary to put on
93 trial the so-called ‘actual’ facts as depicted in law, about those who commit
94 ‘terrorist acts’ and those who ‘fight’ terrorism (Ben-Dor 2011, p. 22). Similarly in
95 the case of American Indians and the cinematic portrayal of female victims of
96 extreme sexual violence discussed in this special edition, aesthetic representation
97 has the ability to alert our senses to injustice but, equally in the wrong hands, is a
98 tool for legitimising savagery and constitutes an abuse of power against the
99 displaced, the unwanted, the outsider and those otherwise categorised as homo sacer
100 (a person designated outside the law who may be killed without consequence:
101 Agamben 1998) and therefore unworthy of law’s protection or even recognition.
102 As a social phenomenon, law is not an autonomous enterprise and cannot
103 maintain a separate discourse because legal issues and disputes arise from the
104 circumstances of human life. Its innate narrativity and literariness depends on a
105 range of other expressive disciplines which lend law’s edicts and precepts authority.
106 Whether as word or image, the aesthetic brings together senses and symbols, and
107 produces meaning through material sensation and belief through feeling. It is,
108 therefore, incumbent on legal scholars to acknowledge and explore the emotive
109 power and ethical utility of aesthetic expression as it occurs within the language of
110 law. In addition, the use of narrative fictions for explicating the excluded
111 individual’s marginal position within society, while not truth-based, have their own
112 value and significance in both enhancing our moral appreciation of the interests of
113 others and supplementing our critical understanding of moral judgments and
114 principles in relation to their application within the context of law. To this end, this
115 special issue brings together a collection of papers which explore the connection
116 between law and literature and the significance of the aesthetic turn in legal
117 scholarship; most of which were presented at the recent annual Socio-Legal Studies
118 Association Conference. Each article addresses a selection of aesthetic and literary
119 forms, philosophies, theories and methodologies in relation to their intersection with
120 law, legal practice and legal dogma.
121 Exploring the ways in which law can be connected to, and improved by,
122 literature, Paul Gerwirtz explains in Aeschylus’ Law that ‘[l]iterature makes its
123 special claims upon us precisely because it nourishes the kind of human
124 understanding not achievable through reason alone but often involving intuition
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125 and feeling as well’ (1988, p. 1050). Not only are juridical-literary mechanisms
126 useful for explicating difficult propositions such as the non-rational and contradic-
127 tory elements of law, but cultural representations (and particularly the novel) are
128 argued to shape the legal mindset or ‘juridical imaginary’ by helping to amplify
129 jurisprudential arguments and elucidate socio-legal trends (MacNeil 2012,
130 pp. 9–11). Furthermore, narrative accounts such as fantasy folklore and science
131 fiction offer a device for ‘othering’ or defamilarising the present by creating a
132 utopos, a ‘no place’ or ‘good place’, within which to conceptualise, for example, the
133 transformative power of technology and consider the implications for human
134 agency, social organisation and identity (Shaw and Shaw 2015, p. 249). The
135 enduring relevance of literature as an elemental constituent of the legal imagination
136 is illustrated in the richly evocative first essay by William P. MacNeil. He uses the
137 allegorical war in heaven, at the core of Philip Pullman’s acclaimed fantasy trilogy
138 His Dark Materials (1995; 1997; 2000), to articulate an ideo-juridical space for
139 consideration of the nexus of threats and opportunities created by unbounded and
140 unruly new technologies in the battle for control over knowledge within the context
141 of global capitalism.
142 The title phrase ‘his dark materials’ comes from a passage in John Milton’s epic
143 Paradise Lost and much of the central conceit of the collection is rooted in the
144 psychomachian world of poet William Blake’s The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,
145 which depicts Heaven as a site of oppressive regulation and Hell as a hub of
146 liberating revolutionary energy. Ultimately the trilogy tells a tale of the struggle
147 between the forces of good and evil; and in common with Blake, characterises
148 human life as gentle and loving when free but quickly becoming rebellious and
149 violent when constrained. Though often categorised as fiction for young adults,
150 Pullman’s imaginatively potent work embraces a profusion of diverse philosophical,
151 theological and scientific concepts in a narrative commingling which includes
152 Judeo–Christian mythology, Greek philosophy, Chinese mysticism, Gnosticism,
153 evolutionary theory, quantum physics and ecological conservationism. ‘His Dark
154 Legalities: Intellectual Property’s Psychomachia in Philip Pullman’s His Dark
155 Materials Trilogy’ provides an exuberant critique of this neo-Blakean vision of
156 Heaven-as-Hell; a place where the rules of religion and holy scrolls are replaced by
157 the regulations of computation and machine code. In this reimagination of the
158 afterlife, with its foundations in human technologies instead of divine agencies,
159 subjective moral directives are superseded by largely unrestrained virtual possibil-
160 ities and the only gods and doctrines are manmade, so humans must take
161 responsibility for themselves.
162 As a response to the lament by Herbert Marcuse over the inability of poetry and
163 the imagination to have outcomes in the real world (and notwithstanding the wider
164 creative and aesthetic dimensions of the end product), software is now considered to
165 be a revolutionary, creative and literary technology which has consequences in
166 everyday life. For Brooks, ‘[t]he programmer, like the poet, works only slightly
167 removed from pure-thought stuff. He builds his castles in the air, from air, creating
168 by exertion of the imagination’ (1975: 57). Through the creative interpretation of a
169 series of dense and fantastical metaphors, MacNeil provides a fascinating insight
170 into the threat posed by the expansion of the iconoclastic free and open source
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171 software movement of virtual, cyber- or digital space to the more tangible and
172 material frameworks of existing intellectual property law. While linking Open
173 Source Initiative leader Eric Raymond’s ‘bazaar’ versus ‘cathedral’ analogy with
174 Pullman’s critique of the Church, the moralistic image of freedom-fighting rebel
175 angels and oppressive divinities is mapped on to the forces for good (free software)
176 and agents of evil (proprietary software) allegory, beloved of the Libre Software
177 movement. To paraphrase Schiller, the object of the hackivists’ play is the beauty of
178 the baud and its goal is software freedom (1967, p. 20). Although inter alia
179 ‘menacing dark lords and plucky hobbits’ provide the backdrop for a thoroughly
180 entertaining satire on the challenge to the authority of intellectual property law, the
181 fundamental political issues surrounding ownership and power are clearly
182 articulated. Having traversed an impressive variety of alternative concepts, theories
183 and ideas drawn from this speculative landscape, the final question posed by the
184 author becomes one of legitimacy; namely, not only how but, more appropriately,
185 who will construct the democracy of digitality against intellectual property’s
186 imperialising ‘dark legalities’?
187 Danish director, Lars von Trier, is considered to be one of the world’s most
188 significant, challenging and controversial filmmakers. Supposedly situated beyond
189 the traditional categories of gendered identifications, the pleasure economy and
190 outright misogyny, his deliberately provocative characterisation compels us to call
191 into question our own troublesome psychic deficiencies, assumptions, projections
192 and biases. Von Trier’s portrayal of women as, inter alia, sadistic, dominant or
193 masochistic and prone to self-abnegation, as with Bess in Breaking the Waves
194 (1996), ‘She’ in Antichrist (2009) and Joe in Nymphomaniac (2013) is not aligned
195 with any particular variety of feminist or indeed anti-feminist politics as they are
196 currently configured. Nevertheless, in narrative, aesthetic and conceptual terms, the
197 instrumentalised representation of explicit sexual violence and subjugation of
198 women is argued in the second essay of this collection, to produce effects which are,
199 in fact, anti-feminist. Even though such cinematic tactics can illuminate instances of
200 social injustice, ‘an appearance is never ‘‘merely an appearance’’, it profoundly
201 affects the actual socio-symbolic position of those concerned’ (Žižek 1997, p. 26).
202 In ‘The Continuing Problem of the Universal to Questions of Justice’, Honni van
203 Rijswijk offers a feminist reading of the first film in von Trier’s USA: Land of
204 Opportunity trilogy, Dogville (2003), which explores the relation of representational
205 practices to questions of feminist justice.
206 Von Trier presents this cynical work of art as a kind of satire. Set in the
207 eponymous fictional town, located in 1930s Depression era North America,
208 Dogville is portrayed as a place that eulogises virtue and generosity while in reality
209 practises neither. Dogville is used here as a case study in order to provide an
210 aesthetic and affective critique of liberal law and liberal democracy, and to offer a
211 critical account of the importance of representational practices to law’s role in
212 adjudicating violence and harm. A bleak Brechtian depiction of an unjust society,
213 the film’s narrative extends the framework of harm beyond the personal to include
214 the violent histories, theories and contexts that have generated foundational legal
215 concepts such as contract and sovereignty, and have even produced the law itself.
216 The idea of ‘contract, for example, is stated to go beyond the literal idea of
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217 exchange to become instead a legitimating metaphor for exploitative and sadistic
218 social and legal relations. In common with other melodramatic epics in his oeuvre,
219 the Danish director plays with the idea of inversion and the overturning of power
220 relations and social conventions. From martyr to murderer, the chief protagonist,
221 fugitive Grace Mulligan, uses her status as wronged victim (of extreme sexual and
222 economic exploitation) to justify sanctioning the brutal massacre of the townspeople
223 via mob hitmen in the final act. By recasting Grace as oppressed-cum-oppressor or
224 victim-cum-villain, the film provides a critique of those narratives in which the
225 ‘other’ is depicted as eventually defeating the subject with whom we are supposed
226 to identify; thereby justifying revenge, retaliation and pre-emptive justice. As van
227 Rijswijk further explains, such stories have historically been used to rationalise
228 racist and colonialist projects.
229 This second essay advances a distinctive interpretation of Dogville—in terms of
230 offering both a critique of existing legal and political constructs, and an exploration
231 of the possibility of constituting alternative legal and political forms—by applying
232 aesthetics and/affect as the main modes of inquiry. It also demonstrates the
233 capability of the medium of film (even films which make uncomfortable viewing)
234 and the imaginative capacities to articulate an effective rhetorical device for the
235 oppressed and profoundly disenfranchised. For queer theorist Jack Halberstam, the
236 imaginative capacities are an essential condition of hope, ‘[w]e have to be able to
237 imagine violence, and our violence needs to be imaginable because the power of
238 fantasy is not to represent but to destabilize the real’ (2001, p. 263).
239 In ‘Truth and Consequences: Law, Myth and Metaphor in American Indian
240 Contested Adoption’, Sarah Sargent illustrates how literature can be utilised not
241 only to distinguish and explain the ‘other’, but can help to determine the bounds of
242 legal discourse in originating positive ‘categories of otherness’. The third essay also
243 investigates the influence of myth and metaphor on law-making and adjudication in
244 relation to the contested adoption of American Indian children. For much of
245 American history, Indians have been reviled, misunderstood and often persecuted;
246 as the imperialist founding myth of ‘Manifest Destiny’ has served to justify a culture
247 of abuse and oppression, by suppressing cultural identity and restricting personal
248 freedoms. From the Removal Act 1830 (which allowed the President to make ‘land
249 exchanges’ and forcibly remove tribes from their ancestral homelands) to the
250 ‘Indian Termination Policy’ of the 1940s–1960s (forced assimilation), the coercive
251 power of American values and institutions has been used to not only impose the
252 dominant European–American culture but to validate moral claims to hemispheric
253 leadership. Consequently, due to a lack of recognised statehood, American Indian
254 nations have possessed few rights and little authority over decisions affecting their
255 own citizens, members and families. In the context of the current Dakota Access
256 Pipeline proposals, which represent continuing government incursions on the tribal
257 lands of the Standing Rock Sioux and earlier disputes over their rights to the land,
258 the Native American struggle for recognition as sovereign nations is not merely an
259 artefact of history but ongoing. Standing Rock Sioux Chairman David Archambault
260 who, under the treaties and US law, is head of a domestic sovereign nation said
261 recently in an interview with the Washington Post on 25 November 2016, ‘This
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262 government honours international treaties like they are the Holy Grail, but within
263 our own homeland, they find ways to break them’.
264 Although the 1970s ‘Self-Determination Policy’ recognised the right to tribal
265 self-government and promoted economic revitalisation—demonstrating a more
266 nuanced acknowledgement of the dynamic interdependence within colonial
267 discourse between the coloniser and the colonised—more recently, the displacement
268 of exclusive tribal authority to make citizenship decisions and controversial blood
269 quantum determinations evidence a growing tendency by the US federal govern-
270 ment towards extending control over the question of who or what constitutes an
271 Indian. This, and other important questions relating to identity, cultural relativism,
272 racial framing and human rights are explored via the recent US Supreme Court case
273 Adoptive Couple v Baby Girl [570 US—(2013)] and Barbara Kingsolver’s Pigs in
274 Heaven. Both the legal case and novel concern the contested adoption of an
275 indigenous Cherokee Nation child, but offer conflicting perspectives on a number of
276 issues. These include the definition of American Indian identity also what is, and
277 ought to be, in the ‘best interests’ of the child in the context of the Indian Child
278 Welfare Act 1978, which governs the removal and out-of-home placement of
279 American Indian children. While there may be some level of resistance to the idea
280 of non-Indians such as Kingsolver telling the stories of (and interpreting the myths
281 of) American Indians, this original exposition illustrates how literature serves an
282 important function in articulating why the traditional frameworks used to explicate
283 racial inequalities still fail to account for the idiosyncratic nature of relations
284 between the US government and indigenous peoples.
285 To better understand the law and the quest for justice, it is usual to consult words
286 in legal texts rather than turn to images for meaning and clarification. Yet legal
287 principles are also effectively expressed by visual means which have the capacity to
288 tell a story of their own. The fourth essay, ‘Exploring Justitia through Éowyn and
289 Niobe: on gender, race and the legal’ explores the enduring allegorical personi-
290 fication of the moral influence of law; representing justice as equality and fairness in
291 the form of a white-skinned blindfolded woman. The image of Lady Justice or
292 Justitia invites multiple interpretations on the meaning of her three attributes, the
293 scales, sword and blindfold; acknowledging, for example, the hermeneutic
294 complexity of each part when considered alone and the interchangeability of each
295 when juxtaposed with one another. Portrayed in many different ways outside the
296 courthouses and civic areas of different countries and jurisdictions—from the City
297 Hall in Manhattan to the Old Bailey in London—her iconic status is reflected in a
298 long history as an artistic subject and medium for public commentary. Attracting a
299 range of diverse depictions, Massachusetts artist and sculptor, Tom Otterness,
300 created a recent public artwork representing Lady Justice as a crafty plump bird
301 perched in a tree with her sword hidden behind her back (Sobieski 2011, p. 60).
302 Undertaking a similarly contemporary, if less mischievous, reading of the image, in
303 this essay Patricia Branco considers the difference and similarities between two
304 fictional heroic ‘warrior women’ Éowyn (from J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the
305 Rings) and Niobe (from the Lana and Lilly Wachowskis’s The Matrix); proposed as
306 possible alternative modern-day symbols of justice. While Justitia is tasked with
307 adjudicating disputes under the law, paradoxically her visual incarnation has created
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308 much disagreement; engendering broader questions about the rightful objectives of,
309 and who is responsible for dispensing, justice. These and other important issues—
310 relating to, for example, the evolution of societal values on race, class and the
311 changing role of women on the legal stage—are interrogated by reference to Éowyn
312 and Niobe along with a range of other significant influences within popular culture;
313 towards moving from an abstract to a more concrete, accessible, impartial and
314 inclusive emblem of justice.
315 The final addition to this collection by Julia Shaw blends literary theory,
316 sociolinguistics and political thought, in addressing the continuing contribution of
317 aesthetic and interpretive practices to maintaining the authority and legitimacy of
318 law. It is claimed that, although relying predominantly on denotative interpretations
319 of law, legal practitioners (particularly members of the judiciary) habitually employ
320 imaginative literary devices to exploit and manipulate the latent potential of
321 figurative language. Because it is synonymous with the symbolic order, law is
322 described as being ‘produced in the dialogue and discourse all about us: in all the
323 things that we read and say, in the music we listen to, and in the art we grow up
324 with’ (Manderson 2003, p. 93). It comprises, therefore, an interdisciplinary,
325 expressive and interpenetrating set of constitutive social conventions within which
326 the performance of imagistic language in framing legal argument and dogma serves
327 as a moral agent and instrument of justice. In ‘Aesthetics of Law and Literary
328 License: an anatomy of the legal imagination’, the function of aesthetic figuration is
329 explored in relation to the conceptualisation of new legal myths and the
330 maintenance of existing legal truths. This requires explicating the impact of
331 history, and rhetorical and aesthetic aspects of legal texts as well as the political
332 context that affects their own reading (Shaw and Shaw 2015, p. 237). The
333 deployment of the legal imagination in constructing novel offences is also discussed
334 in relation to, for example, privacy, the ‘war on terror’ and detention. In the context
335 of the current era of global instability and popular disenchantment, a new aesthetics
336 of security is argued to exert a profound influence over the nature of all types of
337 legal innovations; including, for example, the autocratic Investigatory Powers Act
338 2016 (dubbed the snoopers’ charter) which sanctions extreme surveillance. Too
339 often, these new legal incursions on a variety of individual and collective rights and
340 freedoms impose an unacceptable level of restriction or punishment and function as
341 structures of oppression.
342 The article proposes that the persistence of law’s foundational myths and fictions
343 is largely because of their reliance on the conceptualisation of abstract ideas and
344 principles which appeal to an aestheticised ideal of community. As Peter Goodrich
345 claims, ‘…the sense of communal identity is in large measure a product of the
346 imaginary similitude of a disparate populus and its symbolic or iconic political
347 representations… metaphor elicits the emotion necessary for political love and legal
348 obedience’ (1995, p. 77). Furthermore, the power of institutions such as law to
349 incite, induce or seduce its subjects is only possible because social relations are
350 always subject to sensory experience: consequently aesthetic responses trigger
351 certain emotions which shape our personal and collective notions of beauty which,
352 in turn, can motivate a greater concern for justice. Since objects are ‘felt’ to be
353 either repellent or appealing, the emotions can be directed towards a feeling for right
J. J. A. Shaw
123
Journal : Small-ext 10991 Dispatch : 21-2-2017 Pages : 10
Article No. : 9196 * LE * TYPESET



























354 or wrong, justice or injustice. Consequently, the aesthetic turn in legal scholarship
355 requires more than merely gliding past cruelty and injustice for dramatic effect;
356 rather, it calls for a commitment to expose and submit to critical scrutiny the violent
357 realities of power structures which continue to subjugate and oppress. In Poetry and
358 Commitment, American poet, essayist and radical feminist, Adrienne Rich interprets
359 the aesthetic influence as more than merely a ‘privileged and sequestered rendering
360 of human suffering’, but as ‘a resistance, which totalising systems want to quell: art
361 reaching into us for what’s still passionate, still unintimidated, still unquenched’
362 (Rich 2007, p. 25). For this reason, it becomes imperative to reclaim ‘the aesthetic’
363 as a revolutionary ideal and seek out the human voices which are so often obscured
364 by rules and legal categories, underscored by persuasive aesthetically charged
365 articulations.
366 In conclusion, law is replete with the artful application of figures of speech and
367 imagistic language; and legal institutions collude with other structures of power in
368 the creation of myths and legal fictions on which the authority of law depends.
369 Whilst ostensibly neither true nor false, lawmakers transmute and re-present those
370 narrative constructions across a variety of configurations; as judicial opinions, in the
371 general formation of legal principle, when creating legislation and interpreting
372 constitutional provisions. Although we rarely question familiar narratives, it is
373 imperative to understand the central role of aesthetic formulations in constructing
374 law’s foundational fantasies. Moreover, the myths and the stories told by the
375 custodians of these sacred legal texts require constant vigilance as to their
376 limitations and vigorous interrogation as to their truth.
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